WA Supreme Court Confirms Right to Claim Liens over Improvements on Public Property
It is well known that public property is not lienable in most states, including Washington. However, it has been generally assumed that under Washington’s mechanic’s lien statute (RCW 60.04), improvements constructed on public property are lienable. In Estate of Haselwood v. Bremerton Ice Arena, Inc., No. 80411-7 (June 25, 2009) the Supreme Court of Washington, by a 7-2 majority, issued a decision holding that a subcontractor’s lien attached to an ice arena built on property owned by the City of Bremerton. However, the court noted that, pursuant to RCW 60.04.051, the attachment of a lien to improvements on public land is limited “to the interest of the person who requests the labor or materials, or that person’s agent.” In this case, under the terms of a concession agreement between the city and Bremerton Ice Arena, Inc., the latter party owned the arena for the duration of the concession agreement, while the city retained ownership of the underlying land. Therefore, in determining whether an improvement on public property in Washington is lienable, it is important to inquire into the precise nature of the interest owned by the person that commissions the construction work. The Haselwood Court also held that Washington’s lien priority statute applies to liens over such improvements on public land, such that a mechanic’s lien has priority over a deed of trust where work or professional services commenced or materials were provided prior to the date the deed of trust was recorded. The majority, concurring and dissenting opinions can be read here.
New WA Supreme Court Opinion has several Construction law implications
On June 18, 2009 the Washington Supreme Court issued its decision in Cambridge Townhomes, et al. v. Pacific Star Roofing, Inc., et al., 81003-6. The decision touches on several issues of interest to the construction industry in Washington. In particular, the Court clarified the law about when a corporation may be held liable as a successor in interest to a sole proprietorship (generally, where control in the company remains in the same hands, such that the old entity was effectively just wearing a “new hat”). The Court also enforced a broad indemnity provision in a subcontract, rejecting the subcontractor’s argument that its indemnity should be construed to apply only to third party tort claims. Finally, the court had occasion to revisit RCW 4.16.326(1)(g) which went into effect in July 2003 and requires that construction defect claims be filed within six years of substantial completion of construction or termination, whichever is later. The Court had held in 1000 Virginia Ltd. P’ship v. Vertecs Corp., 158 Wn.2d 205 (1994) that this provision did not apply retroactively. In Cambridge Townhomes, the Court clarified that application of the statute of repose turns on the date when the claim accrues, not when it is filed. You can read the entire decision here.
