Utah Reverses Course on Apportioning Costs of Defense to Policyholders
A recent Utah Supreme Court decision could result in significant benefits to some policyholders in Utah’s construction industry. The case, Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v. Unigard Insurance Co., 2012 UT 1, concerned a fight between two insurers about how to split the costs of defending a lawsuit brought against their policyholder, Cloud Nine. For policyholders, the most notable aspect of the decision centers on the fact that Cloud Nine was uninsured for about six months between the end of Ohio Casualty’s policy and the beginning of Unigard’s policy.
Ohio Casualty argued that Cloud Nine should have paid a portion of its defense costs based on the length of time it was uninsured. The court disagreed, noting that because both insurers reserved the right to control all aspects of the defense, “it would be inequitable to apportion any defense costs to an insured who has no power to select counsel or negotiate rates and no voice in deciding whether to settle the suit,” and therefore “it would be inequitable to hold the insured responsible for the share of defense costs attributable to the time period during which it was uninsured.”
The Ohio Casualty decision is significant because it effectively overrules part of the influential case of Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 931 P.2d 127 (Utah 1997), in which the court held that defense costs should be apportioned to an insured for those periods when it was without coverage.
For policyholders who have had a gap in liability coverage, the Ohio Casualty decision could provide a lifeline. Virtually all liability policies that obligate an insurer to defend its insured—including CGL, professional liability, employers’ liability, and pollution coverage policies—contain language that gives the insurer the right to control significant aspects of the defense. Thus, Ohio Casualty could apply in many coverage gap situations. Moreover, the complexity of many construction disputes makes an insurer’s duty to defend an extremely valuable aspect of coverage. Insurance industry statistics show that the cost of defending a complex commercial case can range as high as 77 cents for every 23 cents paid out to claimants. Scott C. Turner, Insurance Coverage of Construction Disputes § 7:1 (Nov. 2009). Depending on the complexity of the dispute and the length of the coverage gap at issue, the Ohio Casualty decision could spare construction industry policyholders from paying defense costs that could easily tally hundreds of thousands of dollars.
The Increasing Importance of Performance Bonds
There are now 25 states in the U.S. that hold that construction defects are not an “occurrence” and are therefore not covered under commercial general liability policies insuring contractors. Couple this troubling statistic with the ever increasing number of policy exclusions and limitations, and we begin to realize that in many situations the contractor’s insurance policy is inadequate (or non-existent) protection against defects.
The importance of performance bonds as security to pay for construction defects is therefore growing. While some sureties who sell the bonds will tell you that bonds merely guarantee completion, and do not insure against latent defects, the language of the typical bond defies this position.
Bonds plainly state that they guarantee each and every obligation of the contractor under the contract. Those obligations usually include the duty to perform work according to the plans and specifications, the standard of care, and without defect or nonconformity. This author has not seen a bond that attempts to carve out construction defects from its coverage. And bonds do not have the host of exclusions or limited coverage grants that plague the value of insurance policies. By the same token, bonds are not perfect and owners should consider the following to get the most protection from a bond:
First, the bond duration should extend at least as long as the warranty period (typically one year from completion but sometimes longer) and for as many years thereafter as possible, up to the statute of repose period in the state in which the project is located. Because construction defects often appear years after completion, the bond duration is critical. You may pay more for a bond with a longer duration, but if the bond is needed, you should be paying less for the unreliable insurance carried by the contractor.
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Dispute resolution clauses: getting the prenup right before you say "I do."
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Before using AIA forms or any other agreement to begin a project, owners should review and revise those forms to ensure that they contain appropriate provisions governing dispute resolution. Otherwise, you may be stuck suing different parties in different forums for the same set of construction and design defects, you may be unable to recover the costs of litigation if you prevail, or the cost may be too high because you did not select an economical arbitration service.
Arbitration
The choice between litigating in arbitration or litigating in court is complex, and you should consider that choice carefully in each contract. However, arbitration generally saves time and is procedurally simpler. Arbitration also allows you to avoid a jury trial, which may be tremendously beneficial to parties trying to focus attention on defects and away from irrelevant or unfairly prejudicial matters.
In court, any reference to a defendant’s insurance coverage is possible grounds for a mistrial, while in arbitration, most arbitrators are fully aware whether coverage likely exists. The awareness of insurance coverage is particularly important in construction and design defect cases. Owners require designers and contractors to obtain coverage precisely because they want to be compensated for defects, and want the referee resolving their claim to consider that coverage. Preserving your ability to consider insurance coverage is another factor favoring the choice of arbitration over court.
Consolidated arbitration
On most construction jobs, whether commercial or residential, there will be more than one party potentially responsible for a defect. Therefore, your dispute resolution clause must allow you to force different parties into one arbitration proceeding for claims arising from the same or similar defects on the same site.
If you do not require consolidation of related claims, you may end up in more than one arbitration over the same set of defects. This not only increases legal costs associated with litigation, but may produce two different results. An arbitrator in one arbitration proceeding may not feel compelled by the holdings of another arbitrator, even if they are hearing cases arising out of the same set of defects. The arbitrator hearing your claim against the designer may hold that, though the building is defective, it is not due to design defects. Another arbitrator hearing your claim against the contractor on the same building may agree that the building is defective but that the defects are not due to the contractor. In theory, you could fail to collect in both cases.
Attorney fees
Be sure to consider a clause which awards attorney fees to the prevailing party. An attorney fee clause is a double-edged sword. You want it when you have a strong case and are likely to prevail; you want to avoid it when you are not likely to prevail. Of course, at the time of contracting, you have no idea what litigation position you may be in some day, making it hard to decide if you want the clause or not. Many parties who feel they have an economic advantage over the other party to the contract opt for no attorney fee clause, assuming they can outlast their opponent in a litigation battle. Other parties feel that attorney fee clauses encourage litigation because they give the potential plaintiff a belief that its recovery will be that much larger. Finally, owners in particular should consider that most states’ lien statutes give designers and contractors a prevailing party attorney fee right in cases where the designer or contractor are suing for additional compensation (which is the most common claim by those parties). If the owner does not have an attorney fee clause in the contract allowing the owner to collect fees in cases where the owner is plaintiff (the most common being construction defects and delay claims), then the contractual relationship between the parties is unequal. If the owner wants to avoid attorney fees for both sides, it needs to include in its contract an affirmative waiver by the designers and contractors of the attorney fees rights bestowed by lien statutes or other statutes.
Subcontractors and sub-consultants
The agreement between you and your contractor or designer is not an agreement between you and your contractor’s subcontractors or designer’s sub-consultants. So, for example, requiring your contractor to agree to consolidated arbitration will not mean you can force the subcontractors to consolidate if their agreement with the contractor does not require them to. Review subcontracts and agreements with sub-consultants to ensure that those agreements require the parties to agree to consolidate.
Arbitration service providers
There are many different organizations that provide arbitration services. You can compare them by fee structure, the quality of the mediators and arbitrators on their panel, and the procedural rules governing the arbitration. While standard form AIA contracts designate the American Arbitration Service as the default provider, many parties opt for smaller local services with lower fees and good panels.
Oregon Supreme Court Hears Abraham Appeal
Last month the Oregon Supreme Court heard oral argument in Abraham v. T. Henry Construction, Inc., a residential construction defect case. Shortly after the Oregon Court of Appeals published its opinion in September 2009, Ahead of Schedule authors Eric Grasberger (“Negligence Claims Take Another Twist in Oregon” and Kip Childs (“Oregon Court of Appeals Provides Clarification to Contractor Negligence Claims” commented on the decision. The case pits the homeowners, the Abrahams, against their general contractor, Keith Lucas, and framing contractor, Kevin Mayo.
Unhappy with the result in the Court of Appeals, Lucas and Mayo petitioned the Oregon Supreme Court seeking review on several questions that are described in the Court’s media release. Because the case involved several issues frequently litigated in construction defect cases (economic loss rule, statutes of limitation, building codes as the basis for a negligence claim, etc.), the Oregon Trial Lawyers Association (“OTLA”) and Oregon Home Builders Association (“OHBA”) weighed in and filed amicus curiae (literally, “friend of the court”) briefs. These briefs followed predictable lines of argument. Among other things, OTLA urged the Court to decide in favor of the plaintiffs and hold that, among other things, a discovery rule applies to breach of contract actions. For its part, OHBA suggested that the Court find that, absent a special relationship, one party to a contract (such the plaintiff project owner) should not be permitted to assert a negligence claim against the other party (such as the project’s general contractor).
Whether the Court will take up these important issues remains to be seen. However, until they are addressed by Oregon’s highest court (or legislature), these controversial issues will continue to be the source of much legal wrangling and uncertainty for both plaintiffs and defendants alike.
Washington Supreme Court Re-Examines Economic Loss Rule
The Economic Loss Rule plays an important part in construction disputes, but it has not been clearly defined or understood, or so the Washington Supreme Court has recently stated. The Economic Loss Rule has been generally described as applying to “economic damages” in cases where the plaintiff has a contract that addresses or could reasonably address the risk of those economic damages. The Economic Loss Rule has been applied in Washington to disputes relating to product liability and construction matters.
The Washington Supreme Court revisited the Economic Loss Rule in two cases issued on November 4, 2010, Eastwood v. Horse Harbor Fdn., Inc., and In re Affiliated FM Insurance Co, v. LTK Consulting Services, Inc. The court concluded that the Economic Loss Rule had been misunderstood. The nature of damages is not determinative (since many kinds of damages can be stated in monetary terms), and the presence of a contract is also not determinative. Instead, the key issue is really whether the plaintiff can identify a duty owed independently of any contract. The court said that the Economic Loss Rule should be renamed the Independent Duty Doctrine.
In Eastwood, the court ruled that a tenant’s duty to avoid waste was independent of a similar duty stated in the lease, and so the plaintiff in that case could pursue claims in tort and for breach of contract simultaneously. In Affiliated FM Insurance, the court held that an engineer hired by the City of Seattle to make recommendations about repairs to the Seattle Monorail owed a duty of care to the company that operated the Monorail, independent of its contractual duty to the City. As a result, the operating company could pursue a claim against the engineer for negligence after a Monorail train caught fire.
Both Eastwood and Affiliated FM Insurance include multiple opinions, concurring and dissenting, that discuss various aspects of the old Economic Loss Rule, now renamed the Independent Duty Doctrine. All of the opinions should be examined to understand the status of the law in this area.
Two results of interest to construction litigators should survive the restatement of the rule. In Washington, a contractor given faulty plans by its client/owner may not sue the owner’s architect for negligence in preparing those plans. And Washington does not recognize a cause of action for negligent construction. Any case needs to be analyzed on its particular facts, however.
A Rose by any Other Name.... But Are You Really Insured?
Do you think you have adequate insurance protection for your project under an “additional insured endorsement” to another entity’s policy? Or through a “wrap” policy, known as either an Owner’s Controlled Insurance Policy (OCIP) or Contractor’s Controlled Insurance Policy (CCIP), because you are listed as “an insured”? Perhaps not under more recent policies. Check the latest policy language carefully, and you may not like what you find. Many recent insurance policies now include limiting language that restricts the self-insured retention (SIR) provision to payments made only by “The Named Insured,” e.g., “Payments by others, including but not limited to additional insureds or insurers, do not serve to satisfy the self-insured retention. Satisfaction of the self-insured retention as a condition precedent to our liability applies regardless of insolvency or bankruptcy by you.” This past year we have noted a few published decisions that have supported such limiting policy language, allowing an insurer to restrict and ultimately refuse to accept SIR payments from any other insured but “the Named Insured.” What is the result of that interpretation if “The Named Insured” is M.I.A.? The policy is never triggered, thereby precluding coverage and the benefits of the policy to all other insureds. The potential effect on risk management and business protection for your project make those policies worthy of a second look.
Be careful what you ask for Idaho
In the last two decades, the Idaho State Legislature has authorized design-build contracting for many different types of public projects. It appears that the Legislature will continue this trend for highway projects. In February, a House committee voted to print a bill that would allow the Idaho Transportation Department (IDT) to award design-build contracts for highway projects. A similar measure nearly became law last year.
For the most part, the Legislature’s acceptance of the design-build process is good thing. Several years ago, I worked for a commercial contractor. In 2001, I visited our largest project at that time -- a $500 M design-build facility in California. When I asked the project lead whether he liked design-build projects, he was quick to praise the process. He believed that design-build projects equated to fast results, decreased change orders, and less litigation. To him, it was a no-brainer. Many of my colleagues agree.
Since then, I have been involved with several design-build and design-bid-build projects. Although some design-build projects have been successful, that’s not always the case. The moment an owner enters into a design-build contract, it loses something that can be very important to a successful construction project: control. This lack of control – which is caused in large part by undefined design requirements – can lead to significant cost overruns and delays.
To avoid such results, owners should focus on two important actions: careful planning and diligent execution. On the topic of planning, design-build owners should spend significant time defining the project requirements. The design-build contract documents must include, among other things, detailed project design criteria, program requirements, performance specifications, and deliverables. Absent such defined requirements, design-builders are free to run wild.
Professional execution of the plan is equally important. Owners must prudently monitor the design-builder’s work. Too often, owners in design-build projects overlook this task, believing that such role is limited in design-build projects. In fact, the opposite is true. Because the design-builder has more flexibility in design-build projects, owners must arduously monitor the budget and schedule.
Design-build projects present many benefits. IDT, however, should know that it will not be less work for them. The key is for IDT to clearly define the project programs and performance requirements before the contracts are signed, and to monitor the design-builder’s compliance with these requirements throughout the project.
Negligence Claims Take Another Twist in Oregon
Just when you thought it was safe to go back into the water, the Oregon Court of Appeals strikes again with another iteration of the “economic loss doctrine” which defines when parties can sue each other in negligence for construction defects. In Abraham v. Henry (September 2, 2009) the Court held that parties to a contract can sue each other in negligence if a rule, code or standard “independent of the contract” has been violated. A prime source for independent rules, held the Court, is the Oregon Building Code. From now on, we can expect to see plaintiffs including in their complaints that one or more provisions of the Oregon Building Code have been violated. It will be easy to find such violations in most construction defect claims.
The prior standard, enunciated in the Jones v. Emerald case, held that there must be a “special relationship” between the contracting parties in order to support a negligence claim. No one really knew what a special relationship was, but most believed that alleging in the complaint that the owner relied on the contractor’s expertise was sufficient to create such a relationship and thus a right to sue in negligence. Abraham may have changed that belief by pointing out that, at least in that case, there was nothing “special” about the arms-length owner/contractor relationship, and, with or without reliance on the “expertise” of the contractor, each party was acting on its own behalf and for its own benefit.
Other decisions from Oregon courts support the argument that the economic loss doctrine does not bar negligence claims if there is physical property damage, but this argument was not made or at least not addressed by the Abraham court.
The principal reason – if not the only reason – why the economic loss rule is relevant is that Oregon’s statute of limitations for breach of contract is six years from the date of breach (which, at the latest, is usually the date of substantial completion or failure to honor extended warranties). For claims discovered and/or brought after six years, you must be able to assert a negligence theory for the claim to be viable, because the negligence period runs two years from the date of discovery of the claim (as opposed to the date of breach), capped by the 10 year statute of repose (which states that all claims must be brought regardless of discovery within 10 years from substantial completion). Thus, if you cannot assert a negligence claim, you may have no other claim to assert.
The vast amount of time and fees generated in litigating statute of limitations issues in Oregon construction cases is fueled by (1) disparate limitations periods for breach and negligence claims, (2) disparate limitations periods for claims against designers versus contractors, and (3) the every changing – and arguably inconsistent – decisions from Oregon courts on what the rules of the game really are. Oregon needs a “Construction Defect Reform Act” with one limitations period for all claims against all parties on a construction project, governed by a discovery rule and capped by a statute of respose, with a clear statutory answer to the economic loss rule. Until then, uncertainty and high legal fees will continue to be the norm.
Oregon Court of Appeals Provides Clarification to Contractor Negligence Claims
The Oregon Court of Appeals recently issued an opinion in Abraham v. T. Henry Construction, Inc., et al., a residential construction defect case, that helps clarify the circumstances under which a contractor may be sued for negligence. The issue of whether a contractor may be sued for negligence, as opposed to breach of contract is, in many cases, relevant to a determination of whether the owner’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Owners often need to rely upon a negligence claim to get past the six-year statute of limitations that applies to claims for breach of contract.
In Jones v. Emerald Pacific Homes, Inc., which was decided in 2003, the Oregon Court of Appeals held that an owner who had a contract with a contractor could sue the contractor in negligence if the contractor had breached a standard of care that was independent of any contractual duty or standard of care. Some courts generally referred to the non-contractual duty or standard of care as a “special relationship.” The Jones opinion then only begged the question of what constituted a special relationship.
In Abraham, the court held that, among other possibilities, a contractor’s duty to comply with the applicable building code constituted a duty independent of the contract and thereby created the type of special relationship necessary for asserting a negligence claim.
Abraham will be an important tool for owners seeking to pursue construction defect claims in situations in which the owner’s contract claim has expired due to the six-year statute of limitations, but only in certain types of cases. The Oregon Legislature recently passed legislation shortening the statute of ultimate repose (which is different from the statute of limitations) to six years, for medium to large commercial projects. As a result, the issue of whether a contractor may be sued for negligence, as opposed to breach of contract, will be relevant only to residential and small commercial projects and the Abraham case will be relevant only to those situations.
